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DEFENDING THE ABUSIVELY DISCHARGED
EMPLOYEE: IN SEARCH OF A JUDICIAL SOLUTION
ERIC ISBELL-SIROTKIN*

I. INTRODUCTION
The industrial expansion of the last 100 years has spawned a presumption that, without some formal agreement to the contrary, a worker
is employed at the "will" of his employer.' An employer's exercise of
such arbitrary control can lead to hardship for a worker which is difficult
to remedy. An employee may make great financial and psychological
investments in reliance on an employer's representations of a secure
future, but find no avenue of redress when terminated in bad faith or for
a non-job-related reason. Under this presumption, all workers may face
the dilemma of risking their livelihoods and chances of being rehired if
they file an injury claim, participate in a judicial proceeding, or make
complaints about illegal company,practices .2Terminated employees may
lose economic stability, self-esteem and psychological gratification, and
gain only the stigma inherent in such a discharge. 3 By contrast, even if
an injured worker brings a lawsuit for wrongful discharge, an employer
risks only money damages and may win his case merely by pointing to
the presumption that he may terminate at will.
Concern for the interests and expectations of workers has led to a recent
nationwide trend toward abolishing the obstacles posed by the "employment at will" presumption. Courts have begun to question an employer's4
right to terminate for reasons not related to performance on the job.
*Attorney, Reiselt and Rosenfield, Albuquerque, New Mexico. The author wishes to thank Joseph
A. Golden, a fellow practitioner advocating the rights of discharged employees, and to dedicate this
article to workers everywhere struggling for recognition and respect.
I. This presumption provided for discharges at the mere whim of the employer. See infra text
accompanying note 8.
2. "In purchasing labor does the employer buy the right to regulate the employee's day as he
sees fit? Does he purchase the right to ignore the proprieties of conduct, or must he treat the employee
with decency and respect for his physical and psychological needs?" P. Selznick, Law, Society, and
Industrial Justice 135 (1969).
3. A U.S. Department of Labor report demonstrated that "lal change of occupational specialty
usually requires some degree of risk and may require long-term investment in retraining." U.S.
Dept. of Labor. Emp. & Training Admin., Emp. & Training Report to the President 135 (1976).
4. One must not merely view the employment relationship from simply the employer's perspective.
While such protection may lead to a few small employers being "stuck" with employees for whom
they don't personally care, the benefits of a secure and respected labor force far outweigh these
interests. As one court recently found, "it is now recognized that a proper balance must be maintained
among the employer's interest in operating a business efficiently and profitably, the employees'
interest in earning a livelihood, and society's interest in seeing its public policies carried out."
Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 85 I11.2d 124, 126, 421 N.E.2d 876. 878 (1981).
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More courts now accept the premise that there are "areas of an employee's
life in which an employer has no legitimate interest." 5
This trend has not yet appeared in New Mexico courts. 6 Because fewer
New Mexicans are self-employed each year,7 and most employees in New
Mexico are unorganized, 8 most workers in New Mexico still face arbitrary
dismissal of their complaints when they sue for wrongful discharge. This
article will first demonstrate that in light of the foundations of the "employment at will" presumption and the sociological realities of today,
employees in New Mexico should be accorded protection from abusive
discharges by abolishing the presumption of "employment at will." Attorneys, as the conduit from the community to the judicial system, possess
a special responsibility for helping return a sense of fair play to the
workplace. Therefore, the second purpose of this article is to show the
general practitioner in New Mexico how to find and recognize aspects
of the employment relationship which could serve as a basis, in tort or
in contract, for a cause of action for wrongful or abusive discharge. 9
5. Geary v. United States Steel Corp., 456 Pa. 171, 319 A.2d 174 (1974); see also Hunter v.
Port Authority of Allegheny City, 277 Pa. Super. 4, 419 A.2d 631, 636 (1980).
6. A recent New Mexico case, Bottijliso v. Hutchinson Fruit Co., 96 N.M. 789, 635 P.2d 992
(Ct. App. 1981), appeared to ignore the movement toward granting a cause of action for wrongful
discharge, and may be read to reject it. However, the decision is arguably narrow, because it may
be confined to the "precise" instance of discharge for filing a workmen's compensation claim. In
addition, the Hutchinson Fruit decision suffers from various misconceptions. First, the court mistook
the granting of such a cause of action as a "proposed legislative change." 96 N.M. at 790, 635
P.2d at 993. It held that "[t]he sagacity of making changes in the workmen's compensation statutes,
or rights created thereunder, has been generally held to be outside the province of the courts." Id.
at 794, 635 P.2d at 997. Second, the court "adhered" to the "at will" rule under an inappropriate
mutuality doctrine that "an employee may sever his employment at any time voluntarily." id. at
791, 635 P.2d at 994. See infra text accompanying note 22. Third, the court admitted that it has
acted to abolish common law defenses that are outdated, and gave as examples sovereign immunity,
assumption of the risk, and contributory negligence. It then ironically concluded that the legislature
should decide because of the "long-standing recognition of the 'at will' rule." Id. Cf. Hicks v. State,
88 N.M. 588, 544 P.2d 1153 (1975), which held:
The doctrine of sovereign immunity has always been a judicial creation without
statutory codification and, therefore, can also be put to rest by the judiciary. [Citations
omitted.] Merely because a court made rule has been in effect for many years does
not render it vulnerable to judicial attack once it reaches a point of obsolescence.
Id. at 589-90, 544 P.2d at 1154-55.
7. In September of 1981 there were 37,000 self-employed people in New Mexico amidst some
471,400 jobs (7.85%). In 1970, however, there were 294,00 jobs, with 25,300 self-employed
(8.85%). Employment Security Department, Department of Research and Statistics. Telephone interview with Larry Blackwell, Economic Analyst III (Nov. 1981).
8. The average worker in New Mexico is not a member of a labor organization. Less than onethird of the national employed labor force enjoys this protection. Summers, Individual Protection
Against Unjust Dismissal: Time for a Statute, 62 Va. L. Rev. 481 (1976) [hereinafter cited as
Summers]; see also U.S. Bureau of the Census, Dept. of Commerce Statistical Abstract of U.S.
1979, at 392.
9. The terms "wrongful discharge" and "abusive discharge" are used interchangeably in this
article, because the author views all wrongful discharges as "abusive." See infra text accompanying
notes 23-32.
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II. THE "EMPLOYMENT AT WILL" DOCTRINE SHOULD BE
ABOLISHED

A. Historical Perspectives
The "employment at will" doctrine is based on the premise that an
employment relationship without a specific duration is terminable by
either party at any time "for good cause, for no cause or even for cause
morally wrong, without being thereby guilty of legal wrong."'" The
doctrine is of relatively recent origin. Early English common law did not
recognize such an open-ended relationship, but instead provided that a
hiring for an indefinite period should be considered to be a hiring for one
year. Blackstone wrote:
If the hiring be general, without any particular time limited, the law
construes it to be a hiring for a year; upon a principle on natural
equity, that the servant shall serve and master maintain him, throughout all the revolutions of the respective season, as well when there
is work to be done and when there is not."

At first, most jurisdictions in the United States adopted the British common law rule.' 2 There was no presumption that an employee worked "at
will," because the original master/servant relationship existed then in a
highly personalized setting with a sense of commitment and responsibility
on the parts of both parties.
As the nineteenth century progressed and production increased, the
master/servant relationship became more commercial and impersonal. 3
Employer and employee came into less contact with each other, and, as
a result, "many workers became farther removed from ownership." 4 In
addition, the last third of the nineteenth century produced three financial
panics and a severe depression.' 5 The labor force, desperate for work,
10. Payne v. Western & Atl. R.R., 81 Tenn. 507, 519-20 (1884).
I1.1W. Blackstone, Commentaries 425. The Statute of Labours also proscribed a duty to work
and prohibited a worker from leaving his employment or an employer from discharging a servant
before the end of the season. 5 Eliz., ch. 4 (1562).
12. See Graves v. Lyon Bros. & Co., 110 Mich. 670, 68 N.W. 985 (1896); Chamberlain v.
Detroit Stove Works, 103 Mich. 124, 61 N.W. 532 (1894); Davis v. Gorton, 16 N.Y. 255 (1857).
13. Philip Selznick wrote that modem employment often lacks any sense of duty or "relationship,"
and therefore, "[f]rom a legal point of view, the encounter is as casual as the sale of a newspaper
on a city street." P. Selznick, Law, Society, and Industrial Justice 134 (1969).
14. Feinman, The Development of the Employment at Will Rule, 20 Am. J.Legal Hist. 118, 132
(1976) [hereinafter cited as Feinman]. Professor Feinman's excellent article discusses the relationship
between the "employment at will" theory and the development of advanced capitalism. Id. at 135.
As a method to "control labor" by the "owners of capital," the "employment at will" theory became
the "ultimate guarantor of the capitalist's authority over the worker." Id. at 132-33. Feinman adds,
"If employees could be dismissed on a moment's notice, obviously they could not claim a voice in
the determination of the conditions of work or the use of the product of their labor." Id. at 133.
15. Mathews, A Common Law Action for the Abusively Discharged Employee, 26 Hastings L.J.
1435, 1440 n.23 (1975).
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was not in a position to insist upon job security from employers, or upon
the principle of "natural equity" which Blackstone had described. The
pure capitalism concepts of the late nineteenth century did not provide
economic benefits to a worker as a matter of "natural equity." Only if
some economic incentive existed would such benefits be provided, and
there were no such incentives. Under pure capitalism, the worker lost
any economic and social right to be secure in his livelihood. This loss
can be explained as simply a natural consequence of the laissez faire
approach to freedom of contract. 6 This laissez faire theory served to alter
the mutual responsibility which once existed between employers and the
work force. What remained was a precarious relationship based solely
on economics, which was subject to the "master's" whim.
In 1877, Horace Gray Wood, an Albany lawyer, codified this laissez
faire mood in his treatise, Master and Servant, writing:
With us the rule is inflexible, that a general hiring is prima facie a
hiring at will, and if the servant seeks to make it out a yearly hiring,
the burden is upon him to establish it by proof. . . . [I]t is an indefinite
hiring and is determinable at the will of either party. .... 17
Despite accusations of "scholarly disingenuity" for Wood's sources substantiating this inflexible rule,' 8 the courts began to cite Wood's rule, that
general hiring is hiring at will, as authority in defense of the arbitrary
discharge of employees.' 9
The unrestrained right to discharge an employee at will grew until it
gained constitutional protection. In Adair v. United States,2 ° a federal
statute prohibiting employers from discharging employees for their union
activities was declared unconstitutional as an unjust interference with
freedom to contract and the right of the employer to acquire "property."
In Adair, the employer argued that he had a property right in regulating
his workplace in such a manner that he could fire at will, and that the
statute deprived him of this right without due process of law. The Court
agreed. In support of its decision, the Court stated that the employee had
a corresponding right, guaranteed by due process, to leave such employment at will. This established the mutuality doctrine that "the right of
the employee to quit the service of the employer, for whatever reason,
is the same as the right of the employer, for whatever reason, to dispense
16. The spread of the concept may also be attributed to the social Darwinism fervor of the period
which espoused theories of natural selection. The theory suggested a clear division between those
who were the superior "masters" and those who were the weaker "servants."
17. Wood, Master and Servant § 134, at 272 (1877).
18. For a discussion of Wood's use of cases "far off the mark," "scholarly disingenuity" in
to state any policy grounds, see Feinman, supra note 14, at 126.
describing history, and failure
19. See, e.g., Martin v. New York Life Ins. Co., 42 A. 416, 148 N.Y. 117 (1895).
20. 208 U.S. 161 (1908).
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with the services of the employe[e]. ,,2'Because either party had the right
to terminate, the Court reasoned, an "at will" presumption left the parties
equal, and a statute should not interfere with that equal bargaining power.22
The Court's argument failed to recognize the reality of those times when
work was such a rare commodity that an employee could not readily
exercise his right to quit and seek or begin other employment. The Great
Depression sharpened this reality and brought to light the abuses inherent
in absolute power to terminate on the part of the employer.
In the 1930s, Congress again acted to correct these abuses.2 3 The
Supreme Court finally acceded to the change. In NationalLaborRelations
Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,24 the Court upheld protection of
an employee's right to argue for better working conditions under the
National Labor Relations Act. The Court first agreed, in general terms,
that the public's interest in industrial peace, as expressed by the legislature, could outweigh the absolute power to discharge. The Court also
finally recognized that the inequality of bargaining power and the growing
immobility of workers made an employee entirely "dependent ordinarily
on his daily wage for the maintenance of himself and family; that if the
employer refused to pay him the wages that he thought fair, he was
nevertheless unable to leave the employ and resist arbitrary and unfair
21. Id. at 174-75. See also Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915). Note the view of mutuality
in Pitcher v. United Oil & Gas Syndicate, 174 La. 66, 139 So. 760 (1932), which held:
An employee is never presumed to engage in services permanently, thereby cutting
himself off from all chances of improving his condition; indeed in the land of
opportunity it would be against public policy and the spirit of our institutions that
any man should thus handicap himself; and the law will presume ... that he did
not so intend. And if the contract of employment be not binding on the employee
for the whole term of such employment, then it cannot be binding upon the
employer; there would be lack of mutuality.
Id. at 67, 139 So. at 761.
22. 208 U.S. at 174-75. This mutuality doctrine today still impedes efforts to abolish "employment
at will." See discussion of Bottijliso v. Hutchinson Fruit, 96 N.M. 789, 635 P.2d 992 (Ct. App.
1982), supra note 6. This applicability of the doctrine has been dispelled by some courts, however.
These courts view the "at will" rule as a "harsh outgrowth of the notion of reciprocal rights and
obligations in employment relationships." Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 85 Ill. 2d 121,
421 N.E.2d 876 (1981); see also Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 171 Cal. Rptr.
917 (1981). In Pugh, the court found that "(a] contract which limits the power of the employer with
respect to the reasons for termination is no less enforceable because it places no equivalent limits
upon the power of the employee to quit his employment." Id. at 925. These cases hold that the
enforceability depends "on consideration and not mutuality of obligation. Toussaint v. Blue Cross,
, 292 N.W.2d 880, 885 (1980). Simply because an employee was able to
408 Mich. 579,
include the right to be treated fairly in his bargain does not necessitate his giving up his right to
quit. The Michigan Supreme Court, in Toussaint, found that an employer may actually have received
"an orderly, cooperative and loyal workforce" in exchange for granting the employee "the peace
of mind associated with security and the conviction that he will be treated fairly." Id. at
292 N.W.2d at 892.
23. National Labor Relations Act of 1935, 49 Stat. 449, 29 U.S.C. §451 (1976).
24. 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
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treatment.", 25 This recognition of the employee's role and stake in the
economic system began to erode the presumption that an employer had
an unqualified right to discharge. The highest court in the land now
understood that "[t]he general reason behind this development in the
common law seems to have been to give maximum freedom to expanding
industry. "26
Today, partly because of the lessons of the Great Depression, the need
27
to protect expanding industry is not the only goal to be considered..
Greater protection of the worker and the consumer is the trend in both
the legislature and the courtroom. 2" In the light of these recognized economic realities, the "employment at will" presumption is an anachronism
and should be abandoned.
B. Sociological Realities
An understanding of the purely social impacts of absolute employer
discretion over employment indicates as clearly as do the historical and
economic analyses that the "employment at will" presumption should be
abolished. Today's immobile labor market 29 presents higher stakes for
employees, and leaves the employer with enormous power over a worker's
livelihood. The Illinois Supreme Court recently explained this phenomenon by stating: "With the rise of large corporations conducting specialized operations and employing relatively immobile workers who often
have no other place to market their skills, recognition that the employer
and employee do not stand on equal footing is realistic." 3" Thus, a worker's loss in being fired is not only economic, but social. She 3' carries the
loss of self-esteem.
stigma of having been discharged, with a concomitant
32
She may also have difficulty finding another job.
Modem social realities demonstrate how an employer's absolute right
25. Id. at 33.
26. Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 318 U.S. 54, 59 (1943).
27. See infra note 130.
28. See, e.g., cases and statutes infra notes 128, 174.
29. Geib, Non-Statutory Cause of Action for an Employer's Termination of an "At Will" Employment Relationship, 24 N.Y.L. Rev. 743 (1979) (citing J. Galbraith, American Capitalism 114
(2d ed. 1956) and Blades, Employment at Will v. Individual Freedom: On Limiting the Abusive
Exercise of Employer Power, 67 Colum. L. Rev. 1404, 1405 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Blades]);
see also Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 85 I11.2d 124, 126, 421 N.E.2d 876, 878 (1981).
30. Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 85 Ill. 2d 124, 126, 421 N.E.2d 876, 878 (1981).
31. The author prefers to use "she" at various points throughout the article in order to assist the
trend away from male-oriented classifications.
32. Other states have recognized the economic and social evils of the "at will" presumption.
Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 316 A.2d 549, 551 (N.H. 1974) ("We hold that a termination by the
employer of a contract of employment at will which is motivated by bad faith or malice or based
on retaliation is not the best interest of the economic system or the public good. "); see also Palmateer
v. International Harvester Co., 85 I11.2d 124, 126, 421 N.E.2d 876, 878 (1981) ("[U]nchecked
employer power. . . has been seen to present a distinct threat to the public policy carefully considered
and adopted by society as a whole.")
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to discharge leads to abuses. Even a failure to rehire an employee imposes
on him "a stigma or other disability that foreclose[s] his freedom to take
advantage of other employment opportunities." 33 Work also "plays a
crucial role in the individual's psychological identity and sense of order." 34 As one court explained:
Every man's employment is of utmost importance to him. It occupies his time, his talents and his thoughts. It controls his economic
destiny. It is the means by which he feeds his family and provides
for their security.
In days gone by, a man's occupation literally gave him his name.
Even today, continuous secure employment contributes to a sense of
identity for most people.35

Therefore, it is likely than an abusive discharge will "affect the selfesteem of employees no less severely than it affects their economic well
being. "36

The "psychological comfort inherent in ordered relationships binds
workers to their jobs," and, when coupled with today's increased occupational immobility, makes them vulnerable to the expanding economic
power of their employers. 37 This vulnerability arises primarily because
the "substance of life is in another's hands." 38 While the abuses of this
inequality of bargaining power were substantiated many years ago, 3 9 it
is only recently that courts have begun to recognize that the "economic
relationship between the parties require[s] some modification of the unfettered right to discharge. " 0 Replacing a worker's fear that his livelihood
33. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 573 (1972). In Roth, failure to rehire a state
university professor brought a due process challenge. The court did not allow the claim because the
professor failed to demonstrate a stigma or other disability that foreclosed his freedom to take
advantage of other employment opportunities. The employee must demonstrate any stigma. The
court will not presume a stigma from the refusal to re-employ. Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 348
(1976). The employee might demonstrate this through post-termination refusals to hire. Also the
older the worker, the greater the difficulty of finding other employment. See infra text accompanying
note 110.
34. Report of Special Task Force to Secretary of HEW, Work in America 825, at 2-23 (1972)
[hereinafter cited as Work in America].
35. Lowe v. Hotel & Restaurant Employees Union, Local 705, 389 Mich. 123, 142, 205 N.W.2d
167, 178 (1973) (action by union employee against union concerning his wrongful discharge).
36. Work in America, supra note 34, at 22.
37. Shapiro & Tune, Implied Contract Rights to Job Security, 26 Stan. L. Rev. 335, 338-339
(1974) [hereinafter cited as Shapiro & Tune].
38. Blades, supra note 29, at 1404 (quoting F. Tannenbaum. A Philosophy of Labor 9 (1951)).
39. Congress, in adopting the National Labor Relations Act in 1935, found "[i]nequality of
bargaining power between employees who do not possess full freedom of association or actual liberty
of contract, and employers who are organized in the corporate or other forms of ownership association." 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1935).
40. Perks v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 611 F.2d 1363, 1364 (3d Cir. 1979). In Perks, an
employee was required to take a polygraph test as a condition of employment. The court allowed a
"tortious discharge" action, if the discharge resulted from the plaintiff's failure to submit to the
examination. Id. at 1366.
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rests upon the whim of his "master," will help restore a degree of respect
to the profession of working.4'
Yet, granting a cause of action for abusive discharge is not a unilateral
bargain which unfairly ties the hands of the employer. It is in the interest
of all concerned to restore confidence in the abilities and opportunities
of workers for secure employment by recognizing their stake in the economic system. A recent conference on "Work in America" found that
"[w]orkers are unlikely to perform well if they have inadequate job
security." 42 The conference concluded that "[j]ob security is basic to
employee cooperation with change. It will enhance both productivity and
the quality of working life." 43 One commentator noted:
Productivity depends upon more than strict managerial authority and
hierarchical order. The continuity and expertise supplied by a stable
workforce, the benefits from loyalty, and the savings from reduced
training costs and lower turnover all contribute to the long-run success
of an enterprise."
at
Thus, the abandonment, or at least modification, of the "employment
45
concerned.
all
for
advantageous
prove
could
presumption
will"
III. ESTABLISHING A CAUSE OF ACTION
The sociological realities indicate that it is only a matter of time before
the presumption of employment "at will" is abolished. As that presumption disappears, employees' suits against employers for wrongful discharge will increase. An attorney who takes such a case must analyze
and prepare the case carefully.
For the practicing attorney with a possible wrongful discharge case,
the first step is to examine the kinds of facts which can give rise to a
suit for abusive discharge, and to consider the approaches which may
establish a cause of action for the client. One approach has been to
41. The concept of "work" as a "profession" arose recently in light of the research of Studs
Terkel. Terkel asks, "Ought not there be an increment earned though not yet received, from one's
daily work-an acknowledgement of man's being?" S. Turkel, Working, xv (1972). Terkel's excellent
study demonstrates the growing separation of employers from the needs of their employees. He says:
but Scrooge has been replaced by the conglomerate.
"Bob Cratchit may still be hanging on ....
Hardly a chance for Christmas spirit here. Who knows Bob's name in this outfit-let alone his lame
child's." Id. at xvi.
42. Work in America Institute, Final Report of the Oct. 16-18, 1978, Symposium, Work in
America: The Decade Ahead 5 (1978).
43. Id. Dec. 13-15 Symposium 4 (1978).
44. Note, ProtectingAt Will Employees Against Wrongful Discharge: The Dury to Terminate Only
in Good Faith, 93 Harv. L. Rev. 1816, 1835 (1980).
45. The United States remains one of the few industrial nations which has not passed general
protection against "socially unwarranted dismissals" based on reasons unconnected with employment.
For a discussion of such practices in France, Great Britain, Germany, and Sweden, see Summers,
supra note 8, at 508-19.
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examine carefully the "agreement" between the parties to determine if
there has been a breach of contract.46 Another approach is to determine
whether the circumstances surrounding the discharge are so violative of
principles of public policy that the employee should be able to have a
remedy sounding in tort.47 While a lawyer may wish to argue both, a
hybrid cause of action based on the contractual relationship, but sounding
in tort, appears most appropriate." 8

A. Express or Implied Practices
In New Mexico, the "employment at will" presumption does not prevail over an express or implied contract for employment which specifies
some duration. The New Mexico courts have recognized the common
law right to discharge an employee at any time "for just cause or not,"
but have made it clear that the right does not exist if it "is restricted by
agreement. "I'
Therefore, a lawyer who accepts a wrongful discharge case must determine exactly what was the agreement between the employer and the
employee. To make this determination, the lawyer should examine the
intent of the parties as evidenced in negotiations, business usage, the
situations of the parties, and the nature of the circumstances surrounding
the employment.5 0
The attorney must make a thorough factual examination in order to
determine whether an employer's conduct restricted his right to discharge
the employee. An evaluation of these facts may yield an employer's
implied or express practice which precludes abusive dismissals or suggests
that an employee has given some additional consideration sufficient to
support a claim of protection from arbitrary treatment. Different facts
may give rise to different pleading strategies.
1. Assurances
The easiest case to argue is where there has been some oral or written
agreement concerning conditions of discharge. This usually takes place
46. This has often been called an implied contract. See Shapiro & Tune, supra note 37, at 335.
47. See cases cited infra note 128.
48. See infra text accompanying notes 217-219.
49. Jones v. International Union of Operating Engineers, 72 N.M. 322, 327, 383 P.2d 571, 576
(1963). This agreement "may be express or implied; a course of conduct may give rise to a contract
implied in fact." Hillis v. Meister, 82 N.M. 474, 475, 483 P.2d 1314, 1315 (Ct. App. 1971). These
agreements arguably have a strong basis in New Mexico, in that "[p]ublic policy encourages freedom
between competent parties of the right to contract, and requires the enforcement of contract unless
they clearly contravene some positive law or rule of 1ublic morals." Lynch v. Santa Fe Nat'l Bank,
-_N.M. -, 627 P.2d 1247, 1253 (Ct. App. 1981), cert. denied (1981) (exculpatory clause in
escrow account upheld) (quoting General Elec. Credit Corp. v. Tidenberg, 78 N.M. 59, 428 P.2d
33, 40 (1967)).
50. "The primary objective in construing a contract is to ascertain the intent of the parties."
Schultz & Lindsay Constr. Co. v. State, 83 N.M. 534, 535, 494 P.2d 612, 613 (1972).
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at the employment interview. One commentator analogized the interview
to other types of contract negotiations "wherein the parties set the terms
of the contract, albeit in a ritualized and symbolic way." 5 ' Employees
often receive various assurances at the recruiting stage. The lawyer must
find out what an employee was told at the time of hiring. The employer
and employee might have discussed job security or promotions. The
employer might have led the employee to feel that she could be fired
only for certain reasons. These facts are all important. While a contract
without specific duration has been deemed a contract at will, the trend
has been to allow the intentions of the parties to be the "ultimate guide. "52
Some courts have held that promises that an employee would only be
fired for "just cause," if relied upon by the employee to her detriment,
would create a cause of action for wrongful discharge. In Ryan v. Upchurch,53 an Indiana federal district court heard a case involving a woman
who accepted a position because she was promised that she would not
be discharged except for cause. These assurances further induced her to
take part in the company's pension and profit-sharing plan. The company
terminated Ms. Ryan and failed to give her a reason. The lower court
determined that "if the employer made a promise, either express or
implied, . . . that employment is not terminable by him 'at will,' " and
the employee has either "given any other consideration, . . . begun or
rendered some of the requested service, or has acted in reliance on the
promise," the assurances are a valid unilateral contract which cannot be
breached without showing just cause.54 The court cited Professor Corbin
for the proposition that "when parties make a contract of employment
without specifying the length of service, but indicate that it is not terminable at will, the legal effect is that the parties are bound for a reasonable time." 55 The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed this farreaching decision and warned that "not every promise by an employer
will bind him to a contract." 56 The court of appeals, however, reiterated
that an employee could have a cause of action, but must show a "detrimental reliance on [the] employer's promise" not to fire her except for
cause." 57 Ms. Ryan had failed to make such a showing.
The recruitment discussion need not mention the terms "just cause"
51. Comment, Employment at Will and the Law of Contracts, 23 Buffalo L. Rev. 211, 214 n.21
(1974). The lawyer can ascertain this promise of employment during satisfactory performance by
examining the facts and circumstances of the employment. Promotions, more authority and raises
may be indications that the employee has performed satisfactorily and can expect to have a secure
position.
52. Geib v. Alan Wood Steel Co., 419 F. Supp. 1205, 1208 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
53. 474 F. Supp. 211 (S.D. Ind. 1979).
54. Id. at 215-216.
55. Id. at 219. See 3A Corbin on Contracts §684 (1960 & Supp. 1971).
56. 627 F.2d 836, 837 (7th Cir. 1980).
57. Id. at 838 n.2.
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in order to bind the employer. In Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield,58
the vice president of the company assured Ebling, a co-appellant, as an
inducement for him to accept employment, that the vice president would
personally review Ebling's job performance. The vice president further
assured Ebling that he would not be discharged "if he was doing his
job." 5 Ebling was fired without any prior complaints and without the
hearing provided by the oral "employment contract. "' The Michigan
Supreme Court justices concluded:
When a prospective employee inquires about job security and the
employer agrees that the employee shall be employed as long as he
does the job, a fair construction is that the employer has agreed to
give up his right to discharge at will without assigning cause and
may discharge only for cause (good or just cause). The result is that
the employee, if discharged without good or just cause, may maintain
an action for wrongful discharge. 6'
Therefore, New Mexico lawyers must probe carefully for express promises. Established New Mexico case law "requires the enforcement of
they clearly contravene some positive law or rule of
contracts, unless
' 62
public morals.
2. Company Policy
Company policies concerning standards for discharge, either written
statements communicated to the employee or prevailing practices, can
have binding effect. Some courts have used handbook provisions on
severance pay, bonuses and other compensation, which imply continued
employment, to defeat the "at will" presumption.63 With more and more
courts looking past an "at will" label to determine the intent of the parties,
attorneys must scrutinize "the language used, the purpose to be accom-6 4
plished and the circumstances under which the agreement was made"
to determine whether they constituted an offer to contract.
58. 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d 880 (1980).
59. Id. at 884.
60. Id. at 884 n.5.
61. Id. at 890. The termination precluded Ebling from exercising a stock option plan. He was
awarded $300,000 at trial. The Michigan Supreme Court upheld the judgment.
P.2d 1247, 1253 (Ct.
-627
P.2d
62. Lynch v. Santa Fe Nat'l Bank, - N.M. P.2d - (1981).
App.), cert. denied, -N.M....
63. See Pineman v. Oechslin, 637 F.2d 601 (2d Cir. 1981) (Connecticut courts enforce employer
promises such as bonus, pension plans, etc., based on reliance); Hoefel v. Atlas Tack Corp., 581
F.2d 1 (Ist Cir. 1978) (employer cannot fire employee to avoid paying pension payments laid out
in pension plan); Jackson v. Minidoka Irrigation Dist., 98 Idaho 330, 563 P.2d 54 (1977) (vacation
pay in handbook is part of employment contract).
64. Drzewiecki v. H & R Block, Inc., 24 Cal. App. 3d 695, 703, 101 Cal Rptr. 169, 174 (1972).
The court also stated:
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A handbook may contain a written job description, standards for termination, or assurances of job security, any of which can be construed
to overcome the "at will" presumption. In Maloney v. E. I. Du Pont de
Nemours & Co.,65 a printed employment form made no mention of "employment at will," but specified "discharge for cause, layoffs for certain
lengths, and other forms of termination. "' The court found that the67
handbook's failure to state that "discharge may be at Du Pont's whim,''
coupled with various company policies, made employees feel that they
had a permanent place to work. The court held that the contract was for
as long as the employee satisfactorily performed his job.
In Perry v. Singerman,6 8 the United States Supreme Court upheld a
university professor's claim to tenure which was based on his reliance
on a "de facto tenure policy" as spelled out in the Faculty Guide. In
Perry, the Faculty Guide said that "the Administration wishes the faculty
member to feel that he has a permanent tenure as long as his teaching
services are satisfactory.", 69 The court recognized the need to protect the
employee's reliance on the contractual agreement, saying:
[T]he law of contracts in most, if not all, jurisdictions long has
employed a process by which agreements, though not formalized in
writing, may be "implied."... Explicit contractual provisions may
be supplemented by other agreement implied from "the promisor's
words and conduct in light of the surrounding circumstances."...
and acts is found by
And "the meaning of [the promisor's] words
70
relating them to the usage of the past."

The Perry court noted that employees have property rights in their jobs.7 '
The Court noted, however, that the entitlement need not follow "rigid,
We embrace the prevailing viewpoint that the general rule is a rule of construction, not of substance, and that a contract for permanent employment, whether
or not it is based upon some consideration other than the employee's services,
cannot be terminated at the will of the employer if it contains an express or implied
condition to the contrary.
!d. at 704, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 174. However, some courts have held that if a policy handbook provides
no duration, the employment remains at the will of either party. See Uriarte v. Perez-Molina, 434
F. Supp. 76 (D.D.C. 1977).
65. 352 F.2d 936 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
66. Id. at 939.
67. Id.
68. 408 U.S. 593 (1972). See also Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972). While the
constitutional language of these cases has been narrowed by Codd v. Velger, 429 U.S. 624 (1977)
(no hearing required when information on probationary employee is to be kept concealed), and
Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976) (probationary employee not shown to have had expectation
or resulting stigma), the rule of examining the parties' intentions and reliance still remains.
69. 408 U.S. at 600.
70. Id. at 601-02 (citations omitted).
71. The employee was entitled to a hearing as a "person's interest in a benefit is a 'property'
interest for due process purposes." Id. at 601.
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technical forms," '7 2 but should, in reality, denote "a broad range of interests that are secured by existing rules or understanding.73
In Brawthen v. H. & R. Block,74 a California court found that the
circulation of a policy sheet to managers, stating that their positions would
be secure if they performed satisfactorily, served as evidence of such a
separate binding agreement. The court found that the award of over
$200,000 to the employee included "reasonably certain" anticipated profits and upheld the award. 75 Therefore, employees who have relied on
such statements have a viable claim that such offers were not gifts or
gratuities, but "[a]n offer on the part of the employer, with whom the
offer originates, in order to procure efficient and faithful service and
continuous employment." ' 76 When an employee enters into the service
upon that inducement, "it becomes a supplementary contract of which
he cannot be deprived without cause.77
Recently, in Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield,"5 an employee
received oral assurance that "he would be with the company 'as long as
[he] did the job.' "I' He asked about job security and was told "that if
[he] came to Blue Cross, [he] wouldn't have to look for another job
because [the recruiter] knew of no one ever being discharged. "so Toussaint's case was strengthened "because he was handed a manual of Blue
Cross personnel policies which reinforced the oral assurances of job
security." 8 The manual claimed that the policy of the company was to
release employees "for just cause only." 82 The Michigan court held that:
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. 52 Cal. App. 3d 139, 124 Cal. Rptr. 845 (1975).
75. Id. at 148, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 851.
76. Cain v. Allen Elec. & Equip. Co., 346 Mich. 568,
-,
78 N.W.2d 296, 301 (1959)
(action for severance pay allowed) (quoting Roberts v. Mays Mills, 184 N.C. 406, 114 S.E. 530(1922)).
The Cain court stated:
We cannot agree that all we have here is a mere gratuity, to be given, or to be
withheld, as whim or caprice might move the employer. An offer was made, not
merely a hope or intention expressed. The words on their face looked to an
agreement, an assent. The cooperation desired was to be mutual. Did the offer
consist of a promise? "A promise is an expression of intention that the promisor
will conduct himself in a specified way or bring aobut a specified result in the
future, communicated in such manner to a promisee that he may justly expect
performance and may reasonably rely thereon." (Corbin on Contracts, § 13) The
essence of the announcement was precisely that the company would conduct itself
in a certain way with the stated objective of achieving fairness, and we would
be reluctant to hold under such circumstances that an employee might not reasonably rely on the expression made and conduct himself accordingly.
346 Mich. at 578, 78 N.W.2d at 301.
77. Id.
78. 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d 880 (1980).
, 292 N.W.2d at 884.
79. Id. at __
80. Id. at n.5.
81. Id.
82. Id.
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1) a provision of an employment contract providing that an employee shall not be discharged except for cause is legally enforceable
although the contract is not for a definite term-the term is "indefinite," and
2) such a provision may become part of the contract either by
express agreement, oral or written, or as a result of an employee's
legitimate expectations grounded in an employer's policy statements.
4) A jury could also find for Toussaint based on legitimate expectations grounded in 'his employer's written policy statements set
s3
forth in the manual of personnel policies.
Therefore, a policy handbook with assurances should at least get the
client past a summary judgment motion.84
Where there is a company policy, Toussaint indicates that there need

not be a meeting of the minds in contract. The Toussaint court stated:
"No pre-employment negotiations need take place and the parties' minds
need not meet on the subject."85 All the Touissant court required to bind
the company was that "[t]he employer contemplated mutual adherence
to stated company policies'and goals and derived benefits from a cooperative and loyal work force." 86 Thus, a case involving written company
policies may be even easier to win than one involving specific oral assurances.
3. Implied Covenants of Good Faith
When she applies for a position, a prospective employee is sometimes
told that she will have a job for so long as she performs satisfactorily.
These assurances provide a strong basis on which to challenge the discharge of an employee for non-job-related motives because they imply a
secure position unless the employer demonstrates some "genuine dissatisfaction" with the employee's performance. 87 Even without explicit assurances, some courts have recognized a covenant of good faith in all
employee-employer agreements."
This concept is not of recent origin. It was clearly expressed in the
1907 decision of Corgan v. George F. Lee Coal Co.8 9 In Corgan, the
, 292 N.W.2d at 885.
83. Id. at __
, 292 N.W.2d at 896.
84. Id. at
85. Id. at __ , 292 N.W.2d at 892.
86. Id.
87. Clem v. Bowman Lumber Co., 83 N.M. 659, 662, 495 P.2d 1106, 1109 (Ct. App. 1972)
(The satisfaction must be real and in good faith.).
88. See Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917 (1981) (employee
terminated after 32 years): '[I]mplied in law covenant of good faith and fair dealing inherent in
every contract." Id. at 327, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 926.
89. 218 Pa. 386, 67 A. 655 (1907).
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Pennsylvania court concluded that under a contract lasting "for so long
as he . . . satisfactorily performs his duties .

the master must be

genuine." 9

. . ,

the dissatisfaction of

In 1948, the Maryland court, in Ferris

9

v. Polansky, held that

[w]here [an] employer agrees to employ another as long as the services are satisfactory, the employer has the right to terminate the
contract and discharge the employee, whenever he, the employer,
acting in good faith is actually dissatisfied with the employee's work.
[D]issatisfaction . . .must be real and not92pretended, capricious,

mercenary, or the result of dishonest design.
The court decided that a discharge was "wrongful" if the employer feigns
dissatisfaction.

More recently, in Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc.,g4 a California court
confirmed this analysis. The employee in Cleary was dismissed after 18
years of allegedly satisfactory service. He brought suit, claiming a violation of a published company policy that provided for a "fair, impartial
and objective" hearing. While the court did not examine the contents of
the specific policy, it used the policy to support its conclusion that "this
employer had recognized its responsibility to engage in good faith and
fair dealing rather than in arbitrary conduct with respect to all of its
employees." 95 In addition, the court found that the length of service makes
a termination without good cause offensive to "the implied-in-law covdealing contained in all contracts, including
enant of good faith and fair
96
employment contracts. "
An attorney seeking to present a case for abusive discharge must examine whether the client has performed satisfactorily at the job. If so, a
discharge may offend the implied covenant of good faith and give rise
to liability even without specific assurances or company policies. 97 This
will often be true despite an understanding by both parties that an employee can be discharged without cause. In Massachusetts, the court found
that in every contract:
[Tihere is an implied covenant that neither party shall do anything
which will have the effect of destroying or injuring the right of the
90. Id. at ____, 67 A. at 656-57.
91. 59 A.2d 749 (Md. 1948).
92. Id. at 752.
93. Id.
94. 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (1980).
, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 729.
95. Id. at
96. Id.
97. Many jurisdictions hold that if an employee can show evidence of motives other than dissatisfaction the question should be resolved by the trier of fact. See Fortune v. National Cash Register
Co., 364 N.E.2d 1251 (Mass. 1977); Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549
(1974); Rees v. Bank Bldg. & Equip. Corp., 332 F.2d 548 (7th Cir. 1964) (applying Missouri law).
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other party to receive the fruits of the contract, which means that in
every contract there exists an implied covenant on good faith and
fair dealing. 98

Similarly, in South Carolina, a federal district court protected against
terminations which were "contrary to equity and good conscience.""

Historically, New Mexico courts have protected employees from discharges made in bad faith. In Atma v. Munoz, o the New Mexico Supreme
Court adopted the rule that "a promise by one party to a contract to
perform on his part to the satisfaction of the other party is binding; but
the dissatisfaction must be real and in good faith.." 0 Therefore, attorneys
must find out whether the employer can prove actual dissatisfaction with
the employee's services.
B. Additional Consideration

Beyond express or implied practices, courts have enforced agreements
of employment for indefinite duration when the circumstances indicated
the existence of "additional consideration." This consideration, often
required to be independent of services rendered,0 2 serves as evidence
that the agreement provides for some type of job security.
The courts originally recognized additional consideration only when
employees surrendered tort claims, 03 or brought accounts to the business." °n Recently, some courts and commentators have found additional
consideration in the sacrifices of other employment:
[An] employee who spends a significant part of his working life for
one employer to the exclusion of others has conferred a substantial
98. Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 364 N.E.2d 1251, 1257 (Mass. 1977) (quoting Monge
v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549, 552 (1974)); see also Zimmer v. Wells
Management Corp., 348 F. Supp. 540, 541 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
99. DeTreville v. Outboard Marine Corp., 439 F.2d 1099, 1100 (4th Cir. 1971) (allowed tort
action for wrongful termination of franchise agreement despite unilateral termination clause).
100. 48 N.M. 114, 146 P.2d 631 (1944).
101. Id. at 118, 146 P.2d at 633. The New Mexico court indirectly reaffirmed the covenant of
good faith in Clem v. Bowman Lumber Co., 83 N.M. 659, 495 P.2d 1106 (Ct. App. 1972), by
refusing recovery to a fired employee because the employer proved genuine dissatisfaction with the
employee. The trial court in the Clem case used language which appeared to recognize a cause of
action for abusive discharge sounding in tort: "failure of the evidence to establish any tortious
conduct on defendant's part." 83 N.M. at 662, 495 P.2d at 1108. But see infra text accompanying
note 213.
102. Garza v. United Child Care, Inc., 88 N.M. 30, 536 P.2d 1087 (Ct. App. 1975); see Roberts
v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 88 Wash. 2d 887, 568 P.2d 764 (1977) (consideration in addition to the
required services which results in a detriment to the employee and a benefit to the employer). The
court declared that longevity of service was not enough to be "additional consideration." See also
Ryan v. Upchurch, 474 F. Supp. 211 (S.D. Ind. 1979); Schroeder v. Dayton Hudson Corp., 448 F.
Supp. 910 (E.D. Mich. 1978).
103. Sax v. Detroit, G.H. & M. Ry., 125 Mich. 252, 84 N.W. 314 (1900); Harrington v. Kansas
City Cable Ry., 60 Mo. App. 223 (1895).
104. Downes v. Poncet, 38 Misc. 799, 78 N.Y.S. 883 (N.Y. City Ct. 1902).
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benefit on the employer. There seems to be even more truth in the
assertion that such an employee has suffered a real detriment in the
irretrievable loss of productive years, especially when his seniority
and experience are not likely to be readily transferrable to new employment.
In McNulty v. Borden, Inc., " the court allowed an action for wrongful
breach of a contractual relationship where the plaintiff had rejected many
offers of employment upon the employer's representations that the employee would be promoted. The court viewed the employee's sacrifice of
other jobs as sufficient additional consideration to extend the duration of
an employment contract for a reasonable period of time.
The District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals, in Maloney v. E.
' found that the plaintiff was induced to
I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 07
leave his original job with a promise of permanent employment. The
parties executed a written employment contract, but it was indefinite as
to wage and duration. The court found both additional consideration and
an intent to continue the contract "as long as [plaintiff] performed satisfactorily and economics permitted. "108 Thus, a promise of permanent
employment can be binding because the employee "assumes what may
be a substantial burden of diminished employment mobility" upon working with one company so long."9
All of these policies are even stronger when the discharged employee
is an older worker whose occupational mobility has been severely reduced
because he is "locked in" to a particular job or skill. "0 In Ward v.
Consolidated Foods Corp., "' a 60-year-old supervisor was induced to
leave his job under assurances that the new position would be "permanent." 112 The court found that the company had reduced the expenses
inherent in training a new employee by promising Ward a secure position.
Because Ward had borne the cost of his education, and had an investment
of a lifetime in a particular industry, the court found additional consid105. Blades, supra note 29, at 1420.
106. 474 E Supp. 1111 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
107. 352 F.2d 936 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
108. Id. at 938.
109. Id. at 939. The court saw the conditions of trade secrecy placed on Maloney as sufficient
additional consideration because trade secrecy could have a "chilling effect on negotiations with
prospective employers who want to avoid the threat of litigation." Id.
110. It is clear that older workers face such a dilemma. See Hearings on Age Discrimination in
Employment Before the Subcomm. On Labor of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare,
90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967); U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Dep't of Labor Bull. No. 1721, The
Employment Problems of Older Workers 10-12 (1971).
111. 480 S.W.2d 483 (Tex. Civ. App. 1972).
112. Id. at 486. Some courts have found that an offer of permanent employment does not mean
a fixed period, but only a promise of a steady job of some permanence, as distinguished from a
temporary job or temporary employment. See Johnson v. National Beef Packing Co., 220 Kan. 52,
551 P.2d 779 (1976). But see supra text accompanying note 78.
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eration. The case was remanded for a jury determination of whether good
cause existed for the termination.
In Rowe v. Noren Pattern & Foundry Co.," 3' an employer lured an
employee away from a position in which he was one and one-half years
from vesting a pension. The employer promised the employee the protection of union membership after forty-five days. The employee was
terminated after forty-three days. He challenged his firing, and claimed
that he would not have switched jobs "but for the guarantee of the
protection of a union contract.""'4 The court found that where the job
given up is tenured or permanent, and the new job is promised to be
permanent, additional consideration exists." 5 The court allowed the employee protection.
New Mexico accepted the general rule requiring "additional consideration" in its holding in Garza v. United Child Care, Inc." 6 The New
Mexico Court of Appeals, in defining the term "permanent employee,"
declared that "[w]here a contract for permanent employment provides
additional consideration, the employee can recover damages for his discharge when made without just cause."' 7 In light of this holding, New
Mexico attorneys must examine the circumstances surrounding the agreement to determine if the employee gave "any consideration, other than
employment and payment of wages."' 'I
A recent California case, however, Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 119 may
make an "additional" consideration requirement a thing of the past. The
added consideration requirement appeared to the Pugh court to be "contrary to the general contract principle that courts should not inquire into
the adequacy of consideration." 2 ° In Pugh an employee was discharged
after some 32 years on the job. The court explained the development of
the "independent consideration" rule as most likely serving only an "evidentiary function. "12 The Pugh court cited Corbin as clearly providing
that
113. 91 Mich. App. 254, 283 N.W.2d 713 (1979).
, 283 N.W.2d at 718.
114. Id.at __
, 283 N.W.2d at 716. Rowe also stands for the principle that oral assurances
115. Id. at
may come outside the statute of frauds. The court declared that "[w]here an oral contract may be
completed in less than a year, even though it is clear that in all probability the contract will extend
, 283 N.W.2d at 715. The
for a period of years, the statute of frauds is not violated. Id. at
court reasoned that the plant could close down or the employee could be fired for just cause in the
first year. Id. In addition, his reliance in giving up a prior job where he had been employed 13'2
years was "sufficient to circumvent the statute of frauds." Id.
116. 88 N.M. 30, 536 P.2d 1086 (1975).
117. Id. at 31, 336 P.2d at 1087.
118. Id.
119. 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917 (1981).
120. Id. at 325, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 925.
121. Id.

ABUSIVELY DISCHARGED EMPLOYEE

Spring 1982]

"[a] single and undivided consideration may be bargained for and
given as the agreed equivalent of one promise or of two promises
or of many promises."

...

Thus there is no analytical reason why

an employee's promise to render services, or his actual rendition of
services over time, may not support an employer's promise both to
pay a particular wage (for example) and to refrain from arbitrary
dismissal.

22

The court found that it was only more probable that the parties intended
a continuing relationship with a limitation of dismissal power "when the
employee has provided some benefit to the employer, or suffers some
detriment, beyond the usual rendition of service. "_123
An employee who has suffered the detriment of decreased mobility or
who sacrifices other employment may meet the "additional consideration"
requirement which is required by some courts. This is especially true
where employees have moved their families, '2 4 or have taken some other
major action, while apparently relying on an employer's assurances. A
close investigation by an attorney into an employee's job history, options
which the employee has passed up and major reliance expenditures could
provide a basis for a cause of action under an "additional consideration"
theory.
C. Public Policy
After considering the possibility of a purely legal set of arguments
based on contract, the attorney in a wrongful discharge case should consider what policy arguments might be made against the discharge of the
client, based on the circumstances of the case. An employer's motive in
discharging an employee may be so contrary to the public interest that
the court will intervene to curb dismissals even of "at will" employees.
Justice Day, in his 1915 dissent in Coppage v. Kansas, '25 wrote:
It may be that an employer may be of the opinion that membership
of his employ[ees] in the National Guard, by enlistment in the militia
of the State, may be detrimental to his business. Can it be successfully
contended that the state may not, in the public interest, prohibit an
agreement to forego such enlistment as against public policy? Would
it be beyond a legitimate exercise of the police power to provide that
122. Id. at 325-26, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 925 (citations omitted). See I A. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts
§ 125, at 535-36 n.68.
123. 116 Cal. App. 3d at 326, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 925.
124. See Brawthen v. H & R Block, Inc., 52 Cal. App. 3d 139, 124 Cal. Rptr. 845 (1975)
(employee's move to take position was additional consideration); see also Hackett v. Foodmaker,
Inc., 69 Mich. App. 591, 245 N.W,2d 140 (1976) (employee's moving his family from California
and quitting the Navy was additional consideration).
125. 236 U.S. 1 (1915).
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an employ[ee] should not be required to agree, as a condition of
employment, to forego affiliation with a particular political party, or
the support of a particular candidate for office? It seems to me that
these questions answer themselves.' 26

Twenty years later, in National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,'2 7 the Supreme Court found that the absolute right to
discharge at will violated the public's interest in industrial peace. Today,
at least twenty states recognize the "public policy" exception.' 28
What is considered a "fundamental public policy," however, differs
with each jurisdiction. Therefore, lawyers must understand how courts
have identified policies, and which kinds of policy arguments have been
recognized in the context of an action for wrongful discharge.
1. Defining Public Policy
a. What Policy?
One of the most difficult tasks in asserting an abusive discharge cause
of action based on "public policy" is defining just what is meant by the
126. Id. at 37.
127. 301 U.S. 1 (1937); see also Glenn v. Clearman's Golden Cocks Inn, 192 Cal. App. 2d 793,
13 Cal. Rptr. 769 (Ct. App. 1961), which held that "[i]t would be a hollow protection indeed that
would allow employees to organize, and would then permit employers to discharge them for that
very reason, unless such protection would afford to the employees the right to recover for the
wrongful act." Id. at 772.
128. The court in Savodnik v. Korvettes, Inc., 488 F. Supp. 822, 825 n.3 (E.D.N.Y. 1980),
cited thirteen jurisdictions which recognize the tort of "abusive discharge" when the firing violates
some public policy, and five other states, including New York, which appear to be prepared to do
so under propitious circumstances. States in the first category include: Arizona: Larsen v. Motor
Supply Co., 117 Ariz. 507, 573 P.2d 907 (Ct. App. 1977); California: Petermann v. International
Brotherhood of Teamsters, 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 25 (1959); Illinois: Kelsay v. Motorola,
Inc., 74 I11.
2d 172, 384 N.E.2d 353 (1979); Indiana: Frampton v. Central Indiana Gas Co., 260
Ind. 249, 297 N.E.2d 425 (1973); Kentucky: Scroghan v. Kraftco Corp., 551 S.W.2d 811 (Ky. Ct.
App. 1977); Massachusetts: Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d 1251
(1977); Michigan: Sventko v. Kroger Co., 69 Mich. App. 644, 245 N.W.2d 151 (1976); New
Hampshire: Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974); New Jersey:
O'Sullivan v. Mallon, 160 N.J. Super. 416, 390 A.2d 149 (1978); Oregon: Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or.
210, 536 P.2d 512 (1975); Pennsylvania: Reuther v. Fowler & Williams, Inc., 255 Pa. Super. 28,
386 A.2d 119 (1978); Washington: Roberts v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 88 Wash. 2d 887, 568 P.2d
764 (1977); West Virginia: Harless v. First National Bank in Fairmont, 246 S.E.2d 270 (W. Va.
1978).
States in the latter category are: Colorado: Lampe v.Presbyterian Medical Center, 41 Colo. App.
465, 590 P.2d 513 (1978); Idaho: Jackson v. Minidoka Irrigation Dist., 98 Idaho 330, 563 P.2d 54
(1977); Iowa: Abrisz v. Pulley Freight Lines, Inc., 270 N.W.2d 454 (Iowa 1978); Louisiana: Stephens
v. Justiss-Mears Oil Co., 300 So. 2d 510 (La. Ct. App. 1974); New York: Chin v. American Tel.
& Tel., 96 Misc. 2d 1070, 410 N.Y.S.2d 737 (Sup. Ct. 1978), quoted in Savodnik v. Korvettes,
Inc., 488 F. Supp. 822, 825 n.3 (E.D.N.Y. 1980). Recent research by the author disclosed two
, 606 P.2d 127 (1980) (noting that
more recent cases; Keneally v. Orgain, - ..- Mont.
other courts have recognized an action for abusive discharge when firing violates public policy,
although the court did not need to reach the issue because the case did not involve this "public
policy" exception.); Adler v. American Standard Corp., 290 Md. 615, 432 A.2d 464 (1981).
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term. Courts generally define public policy as a broad equitable principle
that "no citizen can lawfully do that which has a tendency to be injurious
to the public or against the public good."1 29 Courts have split, however,
over who should define public policy and what the public policy should
be. One extreme requires that "the employer's interest in running his
business as he sees fit must be balanced against the interest of the employee in maintaining his employment, and the public's interest in maintaining a proper balance between the two."' 30 The other requires a clear
and compelling policy which is spelled out by the legislature. 3'
Failure of the courts to unify behind a general policy against abusive
discharge has led to inconsistent results and complicated distinctions
between "clear" and "indefinite" policies. Some courts have exploited
these difficulties and have effectively restricted the public policy exception. For example, many courts simply have been conservative in identifying a public policy strong enough to support a cause of action when
breached. In Percival v. General Motors Corp.,'32 a General Motors
executive was fired for allegedly disagreeing with the corporation's deceptive practices in its disclosure of required information to the government. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals recognized that "a discharge
is wrongful and actionable if it is motivated by the fact that the employee
did something that public policy encourages or that he refused to do
something that the public policy forbids or condemns."' 33 The court,
however, felt that discouraging disagreement with company policies was
not a sufficient breach of public policy to allow the plaintiff to recover. 134
Therefore, the employer's right to terminate at will prevailed.
-,
344
129. Petermann v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 174 Cal. App. 2d 184,
P.2d 25, 27 (1959). Another statement which attempts to define public policy is that "whatever
contravenes good morals or any established interests of society is against public policy." Good v.
-,
257 N.W. 299, 301 (1934). See definitions at 72 C.J.S. Policv §4,
Starker, 216 Wis. 253,
at 212 (1951). Most recently, the Illinois court defined public policy as that which "concerns what
is right and just and what affects the citizens of the State collectively." Palmateer v. International
, 421 N.E.2d 876, 878 (1981).
Harvester Co., 85 Ill. 2d 124,
-,
316 A.2d 549, 551 (1974). This view
130. Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130,
as reiterated in Illinois, where the supreme court held that "itis now recognized that a proper balance
must be maintained among the employer's interest in operating a business efficiently and profitably,
the employee's interest in earning a livelihood, and society's interest in seeing its public policies
2d 124,
, 421 N.E.2d 876,
carried out." Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 85 I11.
878 (1981).
131. Scorghan v. Kraftco, 551 S.W.2d 811 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977).
132. 539 F.2d 1126 (8th Cir. 1976).
133. Id. at 1130.
134. One court recently cited the sources of public policy as including "legislation; administrative
rules, regulations or decisions; and judicial decisions. In certain instances, a professional code of
ethics may contain an expression of public policy .... Absent legislation, the judiciary must define
the cause of action in case-by-case determinations." Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 84 N.J.
58,
-,
417 A.2d 505, 512 (1980).
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The majority in Geary v. United States Steel Corp.'35 also found no
clear and compelling public policy to warrant judicial relief. In Geary,
a salesman for the company feared that a product was unsafe and warned
the employer. After the product was removed from the market, the company terminated Geary. Despite a vigorous dissent arguing that a "strong
public policy [in preventing injury] . ..has been offended,"' 36 the majority felt that Geary's action was a mere expression of an "educated"
' The court justified its decision by
view and was therefore unprotected. 37
focusing on the fact that the employee bypassed his supervisors and made
such a "nuisance" of himself that discharge was necessary to "preserve
administrative order in its own house."' 3 8 While its real fear appeared to
be an "increased caseload and the thorny problems of proof," 3' 9 the court
did not foreclose the possibility of bringing such actions. The court noted
that there are "areas of an employee's life in which his employer has no
legitimate interest,"' 4 0 implying that different facts might have resulted
in a different holding. 41
To further add to the confusion over public policy, courts have sometimes made a distinction between a public "community interest" and a
matter of purely private concern to the employee. ,42 In such cases, the
courts gave the community interest more weight, and placed a burden on
the plaintiff to prove harm to the community. Courts have considered
individual animosity arising from business judgments 43 and requests by
stockholder-employees to see corporation books'4 4 to be inapplicable to
a public community interest rationale. In Scroghan v. Kraftco Corp., 45
an employee was terminated after announcing his intention to attend law
135. 456 Pa. 171, 319 A.2d 174 (1974).
, 319 A.2d at 181. In his dissent, Justice Roberts recognized the precarious
136. Id. at
position in which the employee found himself. His failure to notify his employers of the defect could
have resulted in his discharge, and yet his loyalty both to the company and to the public did result
in his discharge.
137. Id. at 180.
138. Id. at 178.
139. Id. at 179.
140. Id. at 180.
141. Courts which require statutory expression of specific public policies have failed to place
"employment at will" into its proper perspective. The unfairness of this position was made evident
-,
386 N.E.2d 1026 (Ct. App. 1979), where
nd. App.
recently, in Martin v. Platt, .
the Indiana court viewed two retaliatory discharges for an employee's truthfully reporting kickbacks
taken by a superior as violative of only an "undeclared" public policy. Id. at 1028. The court refused
to override the general "at will" rule unless a statute specifically prohibited discharge. It felt that it
must wait for legislative determination. Thus, both Indiana public policy and a truthful, law-abiding
employee suffered. Cf. Bottijliso v. Hutchinson Fruit Co., 96 N.M. 789, 635 P.2d 992 (Ct. App.
1981), where the New Mexico Court of Appeals also chose to hide behind the legislature.
142. See infra text accompanying note 145.
143. See Pirre v. Printing Developments, Inc., 432 F. Supp. 840 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
144. Campbell v. Ford Industries, Inc., 274 Or. 243, 546 P.2d 141 (1976).
145. 551 S.W.2d 811 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977).
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school in the evenings. The employee attempted to raise a broad community interest in continuing education, but the court would not deal with
this strictly "private" concern. 4' 6 The court refused to extend the protection unless an employee was engaging "in a lawful activity in which the
community has an interest."' 47 In Scroghan, the court's narrow reading
of the public policy exception had the effect of reinstating the "at will"
presumption. The employee did not recover.
In a particularly egregious case, Lampe v. PresbyterianMedical Center,45
the Colorado Court of Appeals also followed the strict "at will" rationale
by upholding a discharge of a head nurse who refused to reduce her staff's
overtime because of her belief that it would jeopardize the care of the
patients. The court, while recognizing the "public policy" theory, deemed
the hiring to be "at will" and would not recognize a claim of abusive
discharge.' The choice which the court forced on Nurse Lampe was to
put the lives of her patients on the line, or to be fired and suffer the pains
of unemployment. This example of insensitivity toward the employee,
patients, and public truly demonstrates the harshness of resorting to strict,
antiquated presumptions such as "employment at will."
Some courts find it easier to restrict the right to discharge an "at will"
employee when the policy is "clear and compelling," 5 ' as spelled out
by the legislature. This undoubtedly makes things easier for the courts,
but it may be an abdication of judicial responsibility. The legislature did
not create the "employment at will" doctrine. Interpretation and protection from abuses of that doctrine, therefore, should fall upon the judiciary.'' The Connecticut Supreme Court, in Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted
146. This position is difficult to reconcile with the Geary court's concern that "there are areas
. 319
of an employee's life in which his employer has no legitimate interest." 456 Pa. at _
A.2d at 180. See infra note 127.
147. 551 S.W.2d 811. 812 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977); see also Ward v. Frito-Lay, 95 Wis. 2d 372,
290 N.W.2d 536 (1980) (employee's discharge for living with another employee upheld).
148. 41 Colo. App. 465, 590 P.2d 513 (1978).
149. Nurse Lampe argued that if she had not refused the reduction of overtime, she might have
been brought before a disciplinary board for negligence. The court ignored this argument. Id. at
__
,590 P.2d at 516.
319 A.2d at 180 n.16 (mandates
150. Geary v. United States Steel Corp., 456 Pa. at __
of public policy need to be clear and compelling); Percival v. General Motors Corp., 539 F.2d 1126
(8th Cir. 1976) (termination for allegedly disagreeing with the corporation's deceptive practices in
its disclosure of information to the government was not such a "well-defined public policy" as to
allow relief).
151. A misconception must be overcome concerning the fear that allowing such relief to employees
, 319
will result in a flood of litigation. See Geary v. United States Steel Corp., 456 Pa. at __
dissenting). The Arizona Court of Appeals recently rejected the
A.2d 174, 182 (1974) (Roberts, J.,
adoption of a public policy exception to "employment at will" and claimed that "[tihe effect of
adhering to such a rule would be to expose an employer to a lawsuit every time he discharges an
employee with a contract terminable at will." Daniel v. Magma Copper Co., 127 Ariz. 320, __,
620 P.2d 699, 703 (Ct. App. 1980). As one Pennsylvania justice put it, however, the argument "is
nothing more than an unarticulated fear of the mythological Pandora's box. . . .The reality is that
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Foods, Inc., 112 recently recognized the difficulty in drawing a line between
actionable and nonactionable policies, but still said: "We are, however,
equally mindful that the myriad of employees without the bargaining

power to command employment contracts for a definite term are entitled
to a modicum of judicial protection when their conduct as good citizens
is punished by their employers."' 53 The court needed no explicit statute
prohibiting discharges, finding that "it is enough to decide that an employee should not be put to an election whether to risk criminal sanction
or to jeopardize his continued employment."' 4
b. Who Recognizes the Policy?
New Mexico lawyers may be faced with the task of convincing the
court that it has the power to override the "at will" presumption and
create a cause of action for the abused worker. Various jurisdictions have
refused to find a cause of action for wrongful discharge for fear that they
will be acting as a legislature. Most recently, in Bottijliso v. Hutchinson
Fruit, the New Mexico Court of Appeals fell victim to this misconception
in its decision that "in light of [its] long standing recognition of the 'at
will' rule, the issue of whether a new cause of action should be recognized
in this state for retaliatory dismissal is more appropriately addressed to
the state legislature than to the judiciary. "I"
The Hutchinson Fruit decision leaves what would constitute a tortious

act, or at least a breach of an agreement in any other setting, barred by
will help to check a serious menace in our society,
* . . a cause of action for wrongful discharge ...
the arbitrary dismissal power of employers." Geary v. United States Steel Corp., 456 Pa. at
319 A.2d at 182.
Deciding a case on such a basis would be a sad formulation in light of the above sociological
realities. A flood of litigation argument is arguably not even a proper subject for judicial determination.
Niederman v. Brodsky, 436 Pa. 401, 261 A.2d 84 (1970). To bring such an action, an employee
would still have to demonstrate a colorable claim which could withstand a summary judgment
motion. The resulting small increase in litigation which might occur is hardly a reason to deny relief
to an employee who has suffered economically and psychologically at the hands of an abusive
employer.
- , 427 A.2d 385, 388 (1980) (quality control director of frozen food
152. 179 Conn. 471,
products challenged his discharge in retaliation for his insistence that his employer comply with
federal law. The court found that the employee was employed "at will," but he was able to make
a tort claim for retaliatory discharge).
, 427 A.2d at 388; see also Adler v. American Standard Corp., 290 Md. 615,
153. Id. at
432 A.2d 464 (1981), which recognized the public policy exception, stating that "modem economic
conditions differ significantly from those that existed when the at will rule was first advanced in the
-,
432 A.2d at 470. The court noted that it could
latter part of the nineteenth century." Id. at
amend the common law "at will doctrine" when it was "no longer suitable to the circumstances of
432 A.2d at 471. The court also stated that new causes of action should
-,
our people." Id. at
be recognized when "compelled by changing circumstances." Id.
- , 427 A.2d at 389. The employee had insisted that the company comply
154. 179 Conn. at
with the requirements of the Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act.
155. Bottijliso v. Hutchinson Fruit, 96 N.M. 789, 794-95, 635 P.2d 992, 997-98 (Ct. App.
1981).
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the unfounded explanation that the employment was presumed to be at
the "will" of the master.'56 New Mexico courts must re-educate themselves to the established principle that the "law be forced to adapt itself
new relations beto new conditions of society, and, particularly, to 5the
7
tween employers and employ[ee]s, as they arise."
In order to assist in this process, the lawyer in a wrongful discharge
action must begin by convincing the court that it is not the first, nor is
it alone, in making these types of decisions. After all, the concept of
caveat emptor was not ended through legislation, but through judicial
intervention in the field of products liability. 5 8 Many courts have recognized their proper roles in bringing the common law up to date. In
New Jersey the court pointed out that
.[t]he law should be based on current concepts of what is right and
just and the judiciary should be alert to the never-ending need for
keeping its common law principles abreast of the times. Ancient
distinctions which make no sense in today's society and tend to
discredit the law should be readily rejected. . .

."9

The Supreme Court of Oregon agreed, and took it upon itself "to create
or recognize new torts when confronted with conduct causing injuries
which we feel should be compensable," so as " 'to grant redress for
injury resulting from conduct which universal opinion in a state of civilized society would unhesitatingly condemn as indecent and outrageous.' "'I A Pennsylvania justice criticized his colleagues' inaction
demonstrating that "[w]hen a seemingly-absolute right or the conditions
of an existing relationship are contrary to public policy then a court is
obligated to qualify that right in light of current reality."' 6
The Maryland Supreme Court recently summed up the "current reality"
when it amended the common law "at will" rule in Adler v. American
156. Consequently, "[ilf the law on duration of service contracts had followed the teaching of
pure contract law, the agreement discerned from the parties' intentions would have been enforced,
rather than resorting to a presumption of employment at will." Feinman, supra note 14, at 132.
157. Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 387 (1898).
158. Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel, 50 Minn. L. Rev. 791, 800-05 (1966); see also Hicks v.
State, 88 N.M. 588, 544 P.2d 1153 (1976)(abolishing the doctrine of sovereign immunity); Williamson v. Smith, 83 N.M. 336, 491 P.2d 1147 (1971) (abolishing the defense of assumption of the
risk); Bottijliso v. Hutchinson Fruit Co., 96 N.M. at 794, 635 P.2d at 997 ("The Courts in New
Mexico have not hesitated to recognize the existence of new causes of action or to abolish certain
common law defenses where public policy or statutory grounds are found to warrant such judicially
sanctioned change.").
159. O'Sullivan v. Mallon, 390 A.2d 149, 150 (N.J. 1978) (quoting Schipper v. Levitt & Sons,
-,
207 A.2d 314, 325 (1965)).
Inc., 44 N.J. 70,
160. Nees v. Hoch, 272 Or. 210, 536 P.2d 512 (Or. 1975) (created public policy exception for
retaliatory discharge).
-,
319 A.2d 174, 183 (Pa. 1974)
161. Geary v. United States Steel Corp., 456 Pa. 171,
(dissenting opinion).
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Standard Corp.'6 2 It stated: "[Mlodern economic conditions differ significantly from those that existed when the at will rule was first advanced
in the latter part of the nineteenth century."' 63 Justice Holmes long ago
made it clear that often 'the most absolute seeming rights are qualified,
A rule designed "to protect
and in some circumstances become wrong."
a burgeoning and mobile economic society"' 65 does not conform to today's
economic and sociological realities. Even the conservative New Mexico
court recently recognized that it has the power to amend the common
law when changing social realities demand amendment. In Claymore v.
City ofAlbuquerque, 166 the court disallowed the old common law defense
of contributory negligence and adopted the more modem concept of
comparative negligence. Similarly, in M & M Rental Tools, Inc. v. Mil' the court created a new cause of action in tort, interference
chem, Inc., 67
with prospective contractual relations. It is difficult to reconcile the New
Mexico court's actions in Claymore and M & M with their insistence in
Hutchinson Fruit that amendment of the "at will" doctrine, which was
created by the courts, is best left to the legislature.
The difficulties encountered from defining public policy exceptions to
the "at will" rule demonstrate the need for a general policy opposing all
abusive discharges. The New Mexico courts can take the initiative by
abolishing the "employment at will" presumption and replacing it with
a protective scheme which grants traditional judicial tort relief to one's
cognizable injuries. An employer who wrongfully discharges a worker
should not be able to hide behind his status as "master" to preclude a
remedy. Once a lawyer can convince the court to disregard the antiquated
"at will" presumption analogies to standard tort elements should provide
the relief. 168

2. Recognized Public Policies
Some courts have recognized certain policies which will support a
cause of action for abusive discharge.' 69 Attorneys should carefully examine whether these policies might apply in their wrongful discharge
cases. It is important that the lawyer ascertain all of the employee's
opinions about the possible motives behind the termination. The attorney
should ask about an employee's past vocal complaints concerning company procedure or working conditions, possible criminal sanctions which
162. 290 Md. 615, 432 A.2d 464 (1981).
-,
432 A.2d at 470.
163. Id. at
164. Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Tafoya, 270 U.S. 426, 434 (1926).
165. Foley v. Community Oil Co., 64 F.R.D. 561, 562 (D.N.H. 1974).
166. 96 N.M. 682, 634 P.2d 1234 (Ct. App. 1981), aff d sub nom.. Scott v. Rizzo, 96 N.M.
682, 634 P.2d 1234 (1981).
167. 94 N.M. 449, 612 P.2d 241 (Ct. App. 1980).
168. See infra text accompanying note 211.
169. See supra text accompanying note 128-154.
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could apply to the employee who did not complain, relations with supervisors outside of work, the dates upon which pensions might vest,
and recent worker's compensation claims or jury service. The creative
lawyer may be able to shape a public policy to fit a specific case. An
understanding of policies which have succeeded in this context will increase the chances that a policy argument will succeed.
a. DiscriminatoryMotive

It is clearly within the public's interest to prohibit discharges which
are based on a discriminatory motive. In Greiss v. Climax Molybdenum
Co.,"70 the Colorado federal district court recently recognized that breach
of this public policy can give rise to a cause of action for abusive discharge. Other jurisdictions have allowed suit for discharges based on
race,' 7' sex, 17 2 and age'73 discrimination. These courts have found that a
cause of action based on a discriminatory motive is necessary to avoid a
chilling effect on one's statutory rights. This policy is a strong one and
may be particularly persuasive 74to the court by virtue of its being clearly
spelled out by the legislature. 1
b. Worker's Compensation Claims

Several jurisdictions have provided that an employee should be free
from the fear of being discharged in retaliation for filing a worker's
170. 488 F. Supp. 484, 487 (D. Colo. 1980) (alleged wrongful termination violated rights under
a labor contract. The court held that "absent an agreement or statute, an employer may discharge
an employee for cause or without cause, except when there is a discriminatory motive."); see also
NLRB v. Acker Indus. Inc., 460 F.2d 649 (10th Cir. 1972); Young v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co.,
424 F.2d 256 (8th Cir. 1970) (per curiam) (can discharge without cause unless the motivating cause
is protected union activity).
171. Davis v. United States Steel Supply, 581 F.2d 335 (3d Cir. 1973) (abusive discharge suit
available because race discrimination is contravention of public policy).
172. Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130. 316 A.2d 549 (1974) (employee refused to
date supervisor).
173. McKinney v. National Dairy Council, 491 F. Supp. 1108, 1118-22 (D. Mass. 1980). It is
necessary to note that certain age discrimination cases have held that when other remedies were
available, it would not be necessary to provide for a cause of action under the public policy exception.
Schroeder v. Dayton-Hudson Corp., 448 F. Supp. 910 (E.D. Mich. 1978); Wehr v. Burroughs Corp.,
438 F. Supp. 1052, 1054-1055 (E.D. Pa. 1977) ("A finding that certain conduct contravenes public
and that there
policy is not enough .... [It] must "violate some well-established public policy ....
be no remedy to protect the interest of the aggrieved employee or society.")
174. Many explicit statutes can provide a basis for a suit. See N.M. Stat. Ann. § 38-5-18 (Cur.
Supp. 1981) (employer prohibited from penalizing employee for jury service); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 509-25(A) (1978) (employer prohibited from discriminating against employee for filing OSHA complaint); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 28-1-7(A) (1978) (employer prohibited from discriminating against employee because of race, age, religion, color, national origia, ancestry, sex or physical or mental
handicap). On a federal level, see the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1976)
(protects those in union activity from discharge without cause); the Veterans Preference Act, 5 U.S.C.
§ 2024(a)(1976) (protects veterans from discharge without cause); the Consumer Credit Protection
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1674(a) (1976) (protects garnished employees from arbitrary discharge); Federal
Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1976) (prohibits race, color, religion,
sex and national origin from being a basis of discharge).
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disability claim. "' The consensus is that "[t]he fear of being discharged
would have a deleterious effect on the exercise of a statutory right" and
would "undermine a critically important public policy. "17 6 In Frampton
' the court compared a cause of action for
v. Central Indiana Gas Co., 77
retaliatory discharge to that of the landlord/tenant policy against retaliatory
evictions: "The fear of retaliation for reporting violations inhibits reporting and, like the fear of retaliation for filing a claim, ultimately
undermines a critically important public policy."' 78 In Sventko v. Kro' the Michigan Court of Appeals endorsed this cause of action and
ger, 79
concluded that "the better view is that an employer at will is not free to
discharge an employee when the reason for the discharge is an intention
on the part of the employer to contravene the public policy of this state." 180
As in Frampton, the court found the public policy easily because of the
statutory provision for filing Michigan claims. This indicated to the court
a legislatively defined policy that their filing not be hampered.
In Bottijliso v. Hutchinson Fruit Co., 5 ' the New Mexico Court of
Appeals gave the legislature's policy-defining role a new twist. The court
chose not to recognize a cause of action in tort for a worker discharged
for exercising his rights under the Workmen's Compensation Act.I82 In
Hutchinson Fruit, the court returned to a Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
holding in the 1953 case of Odell v. Humble Oil & Refining Co.' 83 that
the New Mexico courts "have not judicially restricted the right of an
employer to terminate an employee hired 'at will' except where the dismissal is predicated upon a fraudulent basis." 84 The Hutchinson Fruit
court appeared to base this holding on legislative action in the area of
workmen's compensation. Because the legislature had enacted a com175. Sventko v. Kroger Co., 69 Mich. App. 644, 245 N.W.2d 151 (1976): Frampton v. Central
Indiana Gas Co., 260 Ind. 249, 297 N.E.2d 425 (1973); Brown v. Transcon Lines, 284 Or. 597,
588 P.2d 1087 (1978); Leach v. Lauhoff Grain Co., 51 111. App. 3d 1022, 366 N.E.2d 1145 (1977):
Lally v. Copygraphics, 173 N.J. Super. 162, 413 A.2d 960 (1980); Kelsay v. Motorola, 74 Ill. 2d
172, 384 N.E.2d 353 (1978). Contra. Segal v. Arrow Indus. Corp., 364 So. 2d 89 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1978); Bottijliso v. Hutchinson Fruit, 96 N.M. 789, 635 P.2d 992 (Ct. App. 1981).
297 N.E.2d 425, 427, 428
-,
176. Frampton v. Central Indiana Gas Co., 260 Ind. 249,
(1973).
177. Id. The court also stated: "Upholding retaliatory discharge opens the door to coercion and
other duress-provoking acts." Id.
178. Id.
179. 69 Mich. App. 644, 245 N.W.2d 151 (1976).
180. Id. at 651, 245 N.W.2d at 153.
181. 96 N.M. 789, 635 P.2d 992 (Ct. App. 1981).
182. In this section of this article, the New Mexico Act will be referred to by its current title,
"Workmen's Compensation." The state of New Mexico continues to adhere to its outdated title for
the Act. To eliminate the gender-based form of this Act, the title should be changed from -Workmen's" Compensation to "Worker's" Compensation. Note, 12 N.M. L. Rev. 1, 562 n.15 (1982).
183. 201 F.2d 123 (10th Cir. 1953).
184. Bottijliso v. Hutchinson Fruit, 96 N.M. at 794, 635 P.2d at 997 (citing Odell v. Humble
Oil & ref., 201 F.2d 123, 127 (10th Cir. 1953)).
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prehensive statute, the court declined to get involved: "The sagacity of
making changes in workmen's compensation statutes, or rights created
thereunder, has been generally held to be outside the province of the
courts."' 85 It is not clear, however, how allowing a cause of action for
abusive discharge will be inconsistent with legislative policy in the area
of workmen's compensation. In the end, the court appeared to fall back
on the antiquated view that public policy warrants no new cause of action
because of "New Mexico's long-standing recognition of the 'at will'
rule."' 86 Thus, the court did not use legislatively defined policy to form
its inquiry into whether the discharge was against public policy as did
the courts in Frampton and Sventko. Instead, the court used the "lack
of" legislative action to uphold the "at will" presumption.
It is too early to tell whether this decision will hamper the development
of a cause of action for abusive discharge in New Mexico. The Hutchinson
Fruitcase may be limited to the "precise" question in the field of worker's
compensation due to the existence of comprehensive legislation in the
area in New Mexico. 7 The court indicated in its decision that courts in
New Mexico have "not hesitated to recognize the existence of new causes
of action or to abolish certain common law defenses where public policy
or statutory grounds are found to warrant such judicially sanctioned
change." ' 88 Therefore, while the court awaits the legislature's action to
amend its workmen's compensation statute, it may be willing to recognize
an action for abusive discharge which clearly violates public policy in an
area less pre-empted by legislative action.
c. Jury Duty and Public Service
Another form of abusive discharge which is repugnant to public policy
is an employer's dissatisfaction with an employee for taking time off for
jury duty. In Nees v. Hoch,'89 the Oregon Supreme Court protected the
community interest in having employees serve on jury duty. When Ms.
Nees would not ask to be excused from serving, she was discharged. The
court noted that "there can be circumstances in which an employer discharges an employee for such a socially undesirable motive that the
employer must respond in damages for any injury done."" The Nees
185. Id. at 794, 635 P.2d at 997.
186. Id. See supra note 6.
187. See supra note 6.
188. Bottijliso v. Hutchinson Fruit, 96 N.M. at 794, 635 P.2d at 997. See supra text accompanying
notes 155-168.
189. 272 Or. 210, 536 P.2d 512 (1975).
, 536 P.2d at 515 (1975). Some courts have held that a retaliatory discharge
190. Id. at __
by an employer which is contrary to an express public policy of the state will give rise to a cause
of action in tort for both compensatory and punitive damages. See Leach v. Lauhoff Grain Co., 51
I11.App. 3d 1022, 366 N.E.2d 1145 (1977). The courts have denied punitive damages, however,
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court found a public policy in favor of protecting those called for jury
duty through a statute declaring that it was in the public's interest to have
the most competent jurors serve."'9 The public policy forbidding discharge
for jury duty might apply to other types of public service.
In 1953, in Odell v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 92 the employer
wrongfully discharged an employee for testifying under subpoena before
a grand jury which indicted the employer. The court refused to allow him
to bring an action for abusive discharge because "rights under the contract
would not constitute a tort against them unless the violation thereof amounted
to a tort at common law."' 93 Recent decisions in other jurisdictions' 94
directly contradict such a holding, and the common law is evolving to
provide such a remedy. 9 5 Therefore, a cause of action may now exist for
any retaliation which results from an employee's performing any type of
service in the governmental system.
d. Refusal to Perform an Illegal Act
Society has an interest in seeing that illegal acts are not performed and
that those who know about such illegality may disclose it without retaliation.196 This public policy has also led to a limitation on an employer's
right to discharge. The situation first arose in the famous case of Petermann v. InternationalBrotherhood of Teamsters.'97 Mr. Petermann refused to give pejurous testimony before a committee and was subsequently
discharged. The court recognized the "at will" presumption, but felt that
"[i]t would be obnoxious to the interests of the state and contrary to
public policy and sound morality to allow an employer to discharge any
employee . . on the ground that the employee declined to commit perjury. . . . To hold otherwise would be without reason and contrary to the
where they found that no cause of action existed at the time of the employer's abusive conduct
because there would be no deterrent effect on the employer's action. See Nees v. Hoch, 272 Or.
-,
536 P.2d 512, 517 (1975) (no punitive damages because it established a new tort that
210,
beforehand could not have been determined to be actionable); Brown v. Transcon Lines, 284 Or.
597, 588 P.2d 1087 (1978).
191. Today some states have statutory proscriptions prohibiting abusive discharges in such instances. See Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 725.145(a) (1968); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 38-5-18 (Supp. 1981).
Remember that the trier of fact is always free to infer that there was another reason, other than
refusal to avoid jury service, for the discharge. See Reuther v. Fowler & Williams, Inc., 255 Pa.
386 A.2d 119, 122 (1978).
-,
Super. 28,
192. 201 F.2d 123 (10th Cir. 1953).
193. Id. at 127.
194. See Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 85 III.2d 124, 421 N.E.2d 876 (1981) (complaints of criminal activity of fellow employee to police and follow-up investigation for police is
protected by the state's public policy so as to provide a cause of action for retaliatory discharge);
see supra cases cited in note 128.
195. See supra note 128 for a list of jurisdictions which either recognize the tort of abusive
discharge or appear to be ready to do so.
196. This has been referred to as protecting "whistle-blowers." See Westin, ed., Whistle Blowing:
Loyalty and Dissent in the Corporation (New York, 1981).
197. 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 25 (1959).
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spirit of the law. "'98 The court found that the public's interest in enforcing
the penal code outweighed the employer's interest in discharging the
employee at will.' 99
The holding in Petermann was strongly reinforced in the 1980 California decision of Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co.2" Mr. Tameny was
fired for his refusal to participate in an illegal scheme to fix gasoline
prices. Cut off from his livelihood, he brought a tort action against his
employer. The court decided that "an employer's authority over its employee does not include the right to demand that the employee commit
a criminal act to further its interests, and an employer may not coerce
compliance with such unlawful directions by discharging an employee
who refuses to follow such an order." 2"' The court stated that such use
of the discharge power "violates a basic duty imposed by law on all
employers. '"202 The court found that a tort action was the appropriate
route for an employee damaged by such an act of coercion. The court
declared: "The days when a servant was practically a slave of his master
have long since passed."203

Other jurisdictions have also recognized the need for a cause of action
by permitting a public policy tort remedy. The New Jersey court has
allowed medical employees to complain about ethical and licensing violations without fear of discharge. 2 °" Similarly, the West Virginia court,
20 5
found an employer liable
in Harless v. FirstNationalBank in Fairmont,
in tort for terminating an employee who attempted to persuade him to
conform to consumer protection laws. The lawyer must make an exhaustive analysis of all of the employee's past complaints, grievances
and alleged insubordination to provide a basis for a retaliatory discharge

claim.
, 344 P.2d at 27.
198. Id. at
199. This theory also held true in Trombetta v. Detroit, Toledo & Ironton R.R., 81 Mich. App.
489, 265 N.W.2d 385 (1978) (refusal to alter pollution control reports), and in Harless v. First Nat'l
Bank, 246 S.E.2d 270 (W. Va. 1978) (complaints about employer's violations of consumer credit
laws); see Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 85 111.2d 124, 421 N.E.2d 876 (1981).
876 (1981).
200. 164 Cal. Rptr. 839, 610 P.2d 1330 (1980).
201. Id. at 846, 610 P.2d at 1336-37.
202. Id.
203. Id. (citing Greene v. Hawaiian Dredging Co., 26 Cal. 2d 245, 251, 157 P.2d 367, 370
(1945)).
204. O'Sullivan v. Mallon, 160 N.J. Super. 416, 390A.2d 149 (N.J. 1978) (the public's foremost
interest in medical care provided a remedy for an x-ray technician's discharge for refusing to perform
catheterizations); Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 84 N.J. 58, 417 A.2d 505 (1979) (a physician's employee's complaints against testing a controversial drug did not provide a basis for
challenging his discharge on the basis of public policy. There was no evidence that the practice
would have been illegal, as in O'Sullivan, supra, or that it was clearly harmful.). See supra text
accompanying notes 148-49.
205. 246 S.E.2d 270 (W. Va. 1978). See also Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 85 Ill.
, 421 N.E.2d at 880, which found a "clear public policy favoring investigation and
2d at
prosecution of criminal offenses."

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 12

e. Claim for Pension Rights
An attempt by an employer to terminate an employee to avoid vesting
of a pension plan recently served as an improper motive contrary to public
policy in Savodnik v. Korvettes, Inc. 216 Savodnik is a fine example of
how to use statutory intent to formulate a public policy limitation on
abusive discharges. The court in Savodnik found a strong public policy
favoring the protection of the integrity of pension plans and their participants. The New York Constitution expressed this policy, but the court
also relied on the intent behind the Employee Retirement Income Security
interests of participants in employee benAct (ERISA) " 'to protect
efit plans and their beneficiaries.' "207 The very passing of such an act
was enough to demonstrate to the Savodnik court the "great significance
20
income security has for the millions of the country's retired population."
The court concluded:
To allow an employer to avoid the vesting of rights in a pension plan
after thirteen years of service by a model employee, under the guise
of the employment at will doctrine, does not sit well with this court.
a case to invoke the doctrine of abusive
• . . If ever there were
2 9
discharge, this is it.
Consequently, the attorney who contemplates a wrongful discharge action
should complete a full analysis of all employee benefit plans. Not only
does ERISA provide a special concern for pension rights, but these lost
benefits can be the basis of a large award for the wrongfully discharged
client.
D. Proving Damages
It is only in the area of damages that it may be important whether the
court views the abusive discharge action as one of contract or tort. With
respect to some items, a discharge case is no different from any other
case in the evaluation and proof of damages. The possibility of a defense
of mitigation raises the necessity of establishing and documenting that
the employee has looked for another job. Financial losses after an abusive
discharge can be devastating. Therefore, the attorney should inquire as
to exactly what benefits were lost (medical insurance, life insurance, use
of a company car, etc.). Whether the client suffered damage to her credit
rating or was forced to lose a major item to creditors is another avenue
to pursue. The lawyer must also find out which of the client's career and
long-term objectives were impaired by the firing. These sorts of losses
206.
207.
208.
209.

488 F. Supp. 822 (E.D.N.Y 1980).
Id. at 826 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (1976)).
Id.
Id.
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should be compensable regardless of whether the court deems the cause
of action a tort or a contract action.
Exemplary and punitive damages are more likely to be awarded if
courts view an abusive discharge as a tort committed during the employment relationship, rather than a breach of an agreement. 2 A framework for this type of remedy can be drawn from the extensive tort case
law surrounding wrongful motives. Professor Blades forcefully argues:
Through adaption of the general emphasis on wrongful and ulterior
motives which today pervades the law of torts the courts could fashion
a remedy for the abusively discharged employee and thereby give to
be their own masters as
all employees some assurance that they will
2
to matters not their employers' business. '

In preparation for arguing that the action sounds in tort, the lawyer
should inquire into pre-incident health of the client and determine what
doctors she has seen since her discharge. The client should then see a
psychologist. 1 2 A clear record of all physical (headaches, nausea, curtailed activities, etc.) as well as mental (troubles with sleeping, eating
or nerves) injuries to the entire family would be helpful. Marital problems
conceivably could give rise to a cause of action for the spouse for loss
of consortium.
New Mexico has yet to declare that an employee will have a cause of
action in tort for wrongful discharge. In fact, in Bottijliso v. Hutchinson
Fruit Co., 213 the court of appeals reiterated the older holding that absent
fraud, a violation of an employment contract "irrespective of the motive
therefor constitutes only a breach of contract and not a tort and that the
recoverable damages are limited to those flowing from the contractual
breach and that no punitive damages are recoverable no matter what the
motive that prompted the discharge." 214 In light of this ruling, it may be
210. An appropriate analogy exists in New Mexico in the area of economic compulsion. In Terrel
v. Duke City Lumber Co., 86 N.M. 405, 524 P.2d 1021 (Ct. App. 1974), the court of appeals
described the doctrine's rationale as "to discourage or prevent an individual in a stronger position.
usually economic, from abusing that power by presenting an unreasonable choice of alternatives to
another person in a weaker or more vulnerable position, in a bargaining situation." Id. at 422. 524
P.2d at 1038. The court found that this inequality of bargaining power was clearly established in
the employee/employer context. See text accompanying note 30. Terrel. the defendant, challenged
the award of consequential damages, but the court found that "(e]conomic compulsion cases lend
themselves most readily to the tort analytical framework (duty, breach of duty. causation and damages)."
Id. This duty to refrain from abusive discharges exists if the courts abolish the "at will" presumption.
211. Blades, supra note 29, at 1435 (emphasis in original).
212. Today's sociological realities conceivably make extreme and outrageous conduct actionable
for intentional infliction of emotional distress. See Dominguez v. Stone. 97 N.M. 211. 638 P.2d
423 (Ct. App. 1981).
213. 96 N.M. 789, 635 P.2d 994 (Ct. App. 1981).
214. Id. at 789, 635 P.2d at 994 (quoting Odell v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 201 F.2d at 128);
compare Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 164 Cal. Rptr. at 843, 610 P.2d at 1334, in which the
defendant argued that "because of the contractual nature of the employer-employee relationship"
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necessary to demonstrate that the implied or express employment agreement is merely the basis of the relationship and that the action is brought
in order to challenge the employer's tortious conduct.
This argument is not new. It has existed for the past few years in the
field of insurance contracts. Plaintiffs have been able to recover all damages, including punitive damages, which flow from an insurance carrier's
failure to act in good faith toward an insured. The Arizona Court of
Appeals recently answered the question of whether a breach of contract
can be a tort in the affirmative. In Noble v. National American Life
Insurance Co., 2" 5 the Arizona Court of Appeals found that "[tlhere are
also certain classes of contracts which create a relation out of which
certain duties arise as implied by law independently of the2 express
terms
6
of the contract, a breach of which will constitute a tort." 1
In 1976, New Mexico, in Chavez v. Chenoweth,2 17 described this cause
of action as being separate from the contract in that it is a "tort claim
for unreasonable delay in paying medical expenses under the insurance
contract.

' 218

The Chenoweth court decided that a tort claim could be a

basis of recovery if there were evidence of bad faith on the part of the
insurer. The court defined bad faith as a "frivolous or unfounded refusal
to pay. "219 In light of the mutual duties discussed by Blackstone, and the
present sociological realities which make the employment relationship a
unique "contract," the lawyer in an abusive discharge case can make a
strong argument that such a tort remedy exists when an employer makes
an "unfounded" decision to discontinue paying his employee. Thus, the
cause of action may be considered a tort even if founded on contract.
For purposes of deciding damages, the lawyer must argue these issues.
IV. CONCLUSION
When we examine our economic system in light of today's realities,
it is evident that public interest in New Mexico warrants a redefinition
of the "master/servant" relationship. The courts devised the doctrine of
"employment at will" to deal with a highly mobile, burgeoning capitalistic
economy. Today, times have changed. With the concentration of emthe injury should only sound in contract. The court disagreed, holding that decisions "have long
recognized that a wrongful act committed in the course of a contractual relationship may afford both
tort and the contractual relief, and in such circumstances the existence of this contractual relationship
will not bar the injured party from pursuing redress in tort." Id.; see also Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted
Foods, Inc., 179 Conn. at
-,
427 A.2d at 387 (1980), finding that "contract rights which are
inherently legitimate may yet give rise to liability in tort if they are exercised improperly."
215. 128 Ariz. App. 196, 624 P.2d 874 (1979).
216. Id. at __
, 624 P.2d at 875 (quoting I C.J. § 139, at 1017).
217. 89 N.M. 423, 553 P.2d 703 (Ct. App. 1976).
218. Id. at 429, 553 P.2d at 709.
219. Id.
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ployment power in fewer and fewer hands,22 ° it is necessary to consider
the interests which employees have in the system, and to strike a new
balance in employer/employee relations.
The realities and inequities of today's immobile economic system call
for judicial qualification of the employer's right to discharge employees
for arbitrary and retaliatory purposes. As one federal district court judge
recently said, "Courts cannot hide in ivory towers ignoring the economic
and social realities of modem society, for it is that very society we are
here to serve. As that society changes, so must our thinking." ' 22 ' By

abolishing the "employment at will" presumption in favor of an examination of the parties' intent, and installing the prevalent contract principles of good faith and fair dealing, the courts of New Mexico can
guarantee to employees the benefit of their bargains. Anything less is
clearly contrary to the public good.
New Mexico attorneys must begin to accept and try cases which question an employer's absolute power of discharge. The courts must take
judicial notice of the economic and psychological strain which the "employment at will" doctrine inflicts on the majority of workers. Then the
judiciary may move to protect employees from the whim, vindictiveness,
and retaliatory actions of abusive employers. It was the courts which first
"immunized" employers from liability by devising "employment at will."
The courts must now step forward and care for their casualties.

220. The 500 largest industrial and retail firms constituting only .03% of all corporations accounted
in 1970 for almost 30% of all private non-agricultural wage and salary workers. Compiled from
Economic Report of the President, 1978 Table B-34, at 296; Statistical Abstract 1974, Tables No.
793 and 796, at 484, 486.
221. Sadovnik v. Korvettes, Inc., 488 F. Supp. at 826-27.

